Income distribution by age group and productive bubbles [WP-Eco] by Raurich, Xavier & Seegmuller, Thomas
 Col.lecció d’Economia E17/367  
 
Income distribution by age group and 
productive bubbles 
 
 
 
 
Xavier Raurich  
Thomas Seegmuller 
 
UB Economics Working Papers 2017/367 
 
 
 
Income distribution by age group and 
productive bubbles 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the role of the distribution of income 
by age group on the existence of speculative bubbles. A crucial question is 
whether this distribution may promote a bubble associated to a larger level of 
capital, i.e. a productive bubble. We address these issues in a three period 
overlapping generations (OG) model, where productive investment done in the 
first period of life is a long term investment whose return occurs in the following 
two periods. A bubble is a short term speculative investment that facilitates 
intertemporal consumption smoothing. We show that the distribution of income 
by age group determines both the existence and the effect of bubbles on 
aggregate production. We also show that fiscal policy, by changing the 
distribution of income, may facilitate or prevent the existence of bubbles and 
may also modify the effect that bubbles have on aggregate production. 
 
 
 
 
JEL Codes:  E22, E44.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Bubble, Efficiency, Income distribution, Overlapping generations.  
 
 
Xavier Raurich 
Universitat de Barcelona 
 
Thomas Seegmuller  
Aix-Marseille University, CNRS, EHESS, Centrale Marseille, 
AMSE  
 
 
  
Acknowledgements: This work has been carried out thanks to the financial support of the 
French National Research Agency (ANR-15-CE33-0001-01), the ECO2015-66701-R (MINECO-
FEDER, UE) grant funded by the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad of the Government 
of Spain and Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional, and the SGR2014-493 grant funded by 
the Generalitat of Catalonia. 
ISSN 1136-8365 
1 Introduction
Individuals have heterogeneous savings behaviors over the life cycle. This suggests that
the population size of each generation may a¤ect the asset market and is a determinant
of the asset price. This has been studied by Abel (2001) and Geanakoplos et al. (2004),
among others, who have shown that the relative size of the di¤erent age groups a¤ects
the price of the assets.
We adopt a complementary view taking into account that the distribution of income
by age group is an important determinant of the aggregate savings. Accordingly, we
examine whether the distribution of income by age group also a¤ects the asset market.
Interestingly, cross-country di¤erences in this distribution are very large. Table 1
shows a cross-country comparison of the distribution of income by age group when
we consider three age groups: young, middle age and old. This table shows that middle
age individuals generally obtain the largest fraction of total income, whereas the old
individuals obtain the smallest fraction. However, beyond this common feature, there
are large cross-country di¤erences in the distribution of income by age group. For
example, the minimum value of the fraction of total income obtained by the young
individuals is 33%, whereas the maximum value is 30% larger. These cross-country
di¤erences are even larger if we consider the fraction of total income obtained by the
old individuals. The maximum value of this fraction is 47% larger than its minimum
value.
We are interested in the interplay between income distribution by age group and
the value of assets without fundamental value, i.e. bubbles. Indeed, the literature has
already shown that the existence of bubbles depends on the savings decisions over the
life cycle. In particular, Tirole (1985) shows that bubbles arise when the equilibrium of
an overlapping generations model is dynamically ine¢ cient.1 This form of ine¢ ciency is
explained by imperfections that force individuals to use productive capital to postpone
consumption. In this case, they overaccumulate capital and, hence, the equilibrium
is dynamically ine¢ cient. Tirole (1985) shows that, in this situation, individuals may
use an asset without fundamental value to postpone consumption. Therefore, when
the equilibrium without bubbles is dynamically ine¢ cient, an equilibrium with bubbles
may also exist.2 These bubbles reduce the stock of productive capital and also gross
domestic product (GDP). However, more recently, Caballero et al. (2006) and Martin
and Ventura (2012) provide convincing evidence showing that bubbles arise during
economic booms. Obviously, this evidence suggests that GDP should be larger in the
equilibrium with bubbles. To explain this evidence, we refer to the concept of productive
bubbles, dened as bubbles that facilitate a larger accumulation of productive capital.
Therefore, we can distinguish between unproductive bubbles, that arise when the
equilibrium without bubbles is dynamically ine¢ cient, and productive bubbles, that
may arise when the equilibrium without bubbles is dynamically e¢ cient. Martin and
1See Abel, et al. (1989) for an analysis of dynamic e¢ ciency in OG models.
2The existence of bubbles has been studied in OG models by Samuelson (1958), Tirole (1985) and
Weil (1987), and more recently, by Bosi and Seegmuller (2010), Caballero et al. (2006), Fahri and
Tirole (2012) or Martin and Ventura (2012, 2016). There is a large literature that also studies the
possibility of bubbles in innite horizon models. Some relevant references of this literature are Hirano
and Yanagawa (2013), Kamihigashi (2008), Kocherlakota (1992, 2009), Miao and Wang (2011).
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Ventura (2012) and Raurich and Seegmuller (2015) show that productive bubbles may
exist when there are heterogenous agents that are di¤erentiated by their productivity
of investment.
The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the aforementioned literature by
showing how the distribution of income by age group a¤ects dynamic e¢ ciency of the
bubbleless equilibrium and the existence of productive bubbles. To this end, we extend
the three period OG model studied in Raurich and Seegmuller (2015) by assuming
that individuals work in the rst two periods of life. As a consequence, labor income
is distributed between young and middle age individuals. We will highlight that this
assumption plays a crucial role for our results. In this model, the distribution of labor
income between young and middle age individuals and the distribution of capital income
between middle age and old individuals determine the distribution of total income by
age group. We show that the model can generate the income distributions displayed in
Table 1.
In the model, productive investment is done by young individuals and it is
a long term investment whose return occurs in the following two periods of life.
The bubble is a short term investment that facilitates intertemporal consumption
smoothing. Note that this model introduces an important distinction between young
and middle age individuals. The former invest in productive capital, whereas the later
only invest in nancial assets to smooth consumption. This distinction introduces
heterogeneity across individuals that, as mentioned, is necessary to have productive
bubbles. Therefore, bubbles can be either productive or unproductive.
We rst show that if a large part of the labor income is earned by middle
age individuals and a large part of the capital income is earned by old individuals
then neither the young, nor the middle age individuals are interested in holding the
speculative asset in order to postpone consumption. In this case, an equilibrium with
bubbles does not exist.
In addition to its existence, we also study how the distribution of income by age
group a¤ects whether a bubble is productive or not. On the one hand, we show that
if a large fraction of the labor income is earned by the young individuals and a large
fraction of the capital income is earned by the middle age individuals, households
overaccumulate capital to postpone consumption. In this case, the equilibrium without
bubbles is dynamically ine¢ cient. As in Tirole (1985), an equilibrium with bubbles
exists, but these bubbles are unproductive because they are aimed to postpone
consumption.
On the other hand, we show that bubbles can be productive in two di¤erent cases:
when the income obtained by the middle age individuals is su¢ ciently large and when
it is su¢ ciently small.3 In the rst case, bubbles are used to transfer consumption
from the middle age period to the other two periods of life. Young agents are short
sellers of the bubble. The larger wealth obtained by the young individuals is invested in
productive capital and, hence, the bubble is productive. In the second case, the bubble
is used to transfer consumption from the young and the old periods of life to the middle
3Note that middle age individuals obtain a large (small) fraction of total income when the fraction of
labor income obtained by the young is small (large) and when the fraction of capital income obtained by
the middle age is large (small). Thus, the two situations in which bubbles can be productive correspond
to polar cases of the distribution of income by age group.
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age period. In this case, middle age households are short sellers of the bubble. Young
individuals increase savings to compensate the reduction that the bubble causes on the
level of consumption in the last period of life. Part of the increase in savings is invested
in productive capital, which explains that the bubble is productive.
The distribution of income by age group is largely modied by scal policy. As this
distribution determines the existence of productive bubbles, scal policies may facilitate
or prevent the existence of productive bubbles. To study the e¤ect of scal policy, we
introduce capital and labor income taxes. We di¤erentiate labor income taxes by the
age group of the tax payers, in order to introduce progressive taxes. Regarding the
e¤ect that taxes have on the existence of bubbles, we rst show that, depending on the
age group of the tax payers, an increase in the labor income taxes may either hinder or
facilitate the existence of an equilibrium with bubbles. We also show that an increase
in the capital income tax reduces the income of both middle age and old individuals.
As a consequence, the introduction of this tax facilitates the existence of an equilibrium
with bubbles that will be used to postpone consumption.
We also study the e¤ect of scal policy on the stock of productive capital and, hence,
on aggregate production. On the one hand, in the absence of bubbles, productive capital
is used to smooth consumption and is mainly determined by the discounted incomes
received at each age. This explains that an increase in the labor income tax paid by the
young individuals reduces productive investment and that the labor income tax paid by
the middle age individuals has the opposite e¤ect. On the other hand, in the presence
of bubbles, productive capital is determined by a non-arbitrage condition between the
returns from capital and the returns from bubbles. This implies that labor income
taxes do not a¤ect the stock of productive capital in the equilibrium with bubbles.
Since the bubbly and bubbleless steady states may coexist, we conclude that the e¤ect
of the labor income tax on capital depends on who is paying the tax and also on which
steady state individuals coordinate.
We illustrate numerically the e¤ects of actual scal policies by comparing the tax
rates in the US and in several European economies. We show that capital income
taxes are clearly larger in the US, whereas labor income taxes are larger in European
economies. These di¤erences in scal policy have two clear implications. First, the tax
burden is more concentrated on the young individuals in European countries, which
limits capital accumulation in these economies. Second, the larger capital income taxes
in the US facilitate the existence of a bubble. We illustrate these two implications by
simulating the model using the actual values of the tax rates in the US and in European
economies. We rst show that only in the US economy the value of the parameters is
consistent with the existence of a bubble. We also show that if European economies
change their scal policy and set tax rates at the level of the US economy, then (i) the
stock of productive capital will substantially increase, (ii) several European economies
could exhibit a bubble, and (iii) this bubble will be productive in those economies where
the distribution of income is such that middle age individuals obtain a large fraction of
total income.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 studies
the equilibrium without bubbles and characterizes dynamic e¢ ciency. Section 4 studies
the equilibrium with bubbles and obtains the distribution of income by age group for
which bubbles exist and are productive. Section 5 discusses the e¤ect of scal policy
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on the existence of productive bubbles. Section 6 concludes the paper. Some technical
details are relegated to an Appendix.
2 Model
Consider a three period OG economy that in period t is populated by Nt young
individuals. Let n = Nt=Nt 1 > 0 be the constant ratio between the number of young
and middle age individuals in period t. The utility of an individual born in period t is
ln c1;t +  ln c2;t+1 + 
2 ln c3;t+2; (1)
where c1;t is the consumption when young, c2;t+1 is the consumption in the middle age,
c3;t+2 is the consumption when old and  2 (0; 1) is the subjective discount rate.
Young individuals work and obtain a labor income 1wt that they use to consume c1;t
and invest in both a speculative asset, b1;t; and a non-speculative asset, at+1: The wage
per e¢ ciency unit is wt and 1 > 0 measures the e¢ ciency units of a young worker. We
assume that only the young individuals can invest in the non-speculative asset, which is
a long term investment that provides returns in the following two periods of life. In the
second period of life, agents also work and obtain a labor income 2wt+1; where 2 > 0
measures the e¢ ciency units of a middle age worker. These workers also obtain capital
income from the return on the non-speculative asset, 1qt+1: The return of one unit of
productive capital is qt+1 and 1 are the units of productive capital that middle age
individuals obtain from one unit of investment. Finally, they sell the speculative asset,
Rt+1b1;t: The return from selling the bubble, Rt+1; is the growth rate of the price of the
bubble. The income obtained by middle age individuals is used to consume, c2;t+1; and
invest in speculative assets, b2;t+1. In the last period of life, individuals are retired and,
hence, they do not obtain labor income. They sell the speculative asset, Rt+2b2;t+1;
and they obtain 2qt+2 from the return on the non-speculative asset, where 2 are the
units of productive capital that old individuals obtain from one unit of investment done
in the rst period of life. Old individuals consume c3;t+2: It follows that the budget
constraints of the young, middle age and old individuals are, respectively,
c1;t + at+1 + b1;t = 1wt; (2)
c2;t+1 + b2;t+1 = 2wt+1 + qt+11at+1 +Rt+1b1;t; (3)
c3;t+2 = Rt+2b2;t+1 + qt+22at+1: (4)
We note rst that the investment in the non-speculative asset only when young is
a simplifying assumption aimed to introduce a relevant di¤erence in the productivity
of the investment decisions of the di¤erent age groups. In fact, it is a reasonable
assumption once this productive investment is considered as investment in education or
investment in new companies. These forms of productive investment clearly decline as
individuals get older. We also note that the return on productive investment depends on
whether the investment has been done one or two periods before. This is a consequence
of assuming that the productivity of capital depends on the period in which investment
has been done. This is formalized through a simple form of vintage capital. This second
assumption is introduced to generate the distribution of capital income between middle
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age and old individuals. Similarly, the di¤erence in the e¢ ciency units of labor between
young and middle age individuals is introduced to generate the distribution of labor
income between these two groups of individuals. The joint distribution of labor and
capital income will be used in our analysis to determine the distribution of total income
by age group.
Technology is characterized by the following aggregate production function:
Yt = AK

t L
1 
t ; with A > 0 and  2 (0; 1);
where Yt is aggregate production, Lt the total amount of e¢ ciency units of labor and
Kt the stock of productive capital in the economy. Using kt  Kt=Lt, Yt=Lt = Akt
and competitive factor prices satisfy:
wt = (1  )Akt ; (5)
and
qt = Ak
 1
t : (6)
We complete the characterization of the model with the market clearing conditions
for capital, labor and the speculative asset. The market clearing condition for capital
is:
Kt = Nt 11at +Nt 22at 1;
where 1at and 2at 1 measure, respectively, the units of productive capital owned by
middle age and old individuals. The market clearing condition for e¢ ciency units of
labor is:
Lt = Nt1 +Nt 12;
where 1 and 2 measure, respectively, the e¢ ciency units of labor provided by young
and middle age workers. We use these two market clearing conditions to dene the
fraction of productive capital owned by the middle age individuals:

t =
n1at
n1at + 2at 1
; (7)
and the fraction of e¢ ciency units of employment provided by the young individuals:
 =
n1
n1 + 2
: (8)
Note that at a steady state with at = at 1; the fraction of productive capital simplies
to the following parameter:

 =
n1
n1 + 2
:
The fractions  and 
 measure the distribution of labor and capital income by age
group. In Appendix E, we use the distribution of total income by age group displayed
in Table 1 and two plausible assumptions of the model, the old do not obtain labor
income and the young do not obtain capital income, to obtain the values of  and 

displayed in Table 2. This table shows huge di¤erences across-countries in the value of
 and 
: As an example, the largest value of  is 58% larger than its minimum value
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and the largest value of 
 is 91% larger than its minimum value. Note that these very
large di¤erences are the consequence of both di¤erences in the relative size of the age
groups and also di¤erences in the average income of each age group.
From the previous two market clearing conditions, we also obtain that capital per
e¢ ciency unit of labor is:
kt =
Nt 11at +Nt 22at 1
Nt1 +Nt 12
;
which can be rewritten as:
kt =
1
n1 + 2
at +
2
n21 + n2
at 1: (9)
We assume that the speculative asset is supplied in one unit at a price pt in period
t. New investments in this asset by young and middle age individuals are in quantities
t and 1   t, respectively. Therefore, the values of this asset bought or sold by these
agents are B1;t = b1;tNt = ptt and B2;t = b2;tNt 1 = pt(1   t). Since this asset
has no fundamental value, it is a bubble if pt = B1;t + B2;t > 0, which happens when
nb1;t+b2;t > 0: Finally, the market clearing condition for the speculative asset at period
t+ 1 is:
Nt+1b1;t+1 +Ntb2;t+1 = Rt+1 (Ntb1;t +Nt 1b2;t) :
The left-hand side of the previous equation is the value of the speculative asset bought
by young and middle age individuals, whereas the right-hand side is the value of the
speculative asset sold by middle age and old individuals. The speculative asset sold in
period t+ 1 is multiplied by the growth rate of the price, Rt+1; as it was purchased in
period t. This equation can be rewritten as:
nb1;t+1 + b2;t+1 =
Rt+1
n
(nb1;t + b2;t) : (10)
From the previous arguments, it follows that there is a bubble when nb1;t+ b2t > 0,
while a bubbleless equilibrium is given by b1;t = b2t = 0.
3 Equilibria without bubble
We start by analyzing the model when there is no bubble, i.e. b1;t = b2;t = 0. In this
case, the households budget constraint rewrites:
c1;t = 1wt   at+1; (11)
c2;t+1 = 2wt+1 + qt+11at+1; (12)
c3;t+2 = qt+22at+1: (13)
Maximizing the utility under the budget constraints (11)-(13), we get:
wt+1 =
qt+1at+11
2
" 
 + 2

1wt  
 
1 +  + 2

at+1 
1 + 2

at+1   21wt
#
: (14)
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From using (5) and (6), the previous equation can be rewritten as
kt+1 =
at+11
(1  ) 2
" 
 + 2

1 (1  )Akt  
 
1 +  + 2

at+1 
1 + 2

at+1   21 (1  )Akt
#
: (15)
Note that using (15), we can implicitly dene at+1 as a function of kt+1 and kt.
Substituting it into (9), we deduce that kt+1 implicitly depends on kt and kt 1. This
explains that two initial conditions, k 1 > 0 and k0 > 0, are required.
Denition 1 Given k 1 > 0 and k0 > 0, an equilibrium without bubble is a path
fkt; atg1t=1 that solves the system of equations (9) and (15).
In the following, we restrict our attention to steady states, because our main aim
is to compare stationary equilibria with and without bubbles, and understand the role
of the distribution of income by age group.
3.1 Steady State
We use (9) and (15) to show that there is a unique steady state and, using (7) and (8),
it can be shown that the steady state values of productive investment, a; and capital,
k; are:
a =

n1
1
k; (16)
k =
 
(1  ) (1  ) + 

(1  )2 (1  ) + 
   + 2 + 1
! 1
 1  
n
(1  )1A
 1
 1
: (17)
Note that the capital stock at the steady state increases with the fraction of labor
income obtained by the young individuals, ; and it also increases with the fraction of
capital income obtained by the middle age individuals, 
: On the one hand, an increase
in  rises the income obtained by the young individuals, who then increase investment
in productive capital. On the other hand, an increase in 
 reduces the income obtained
by old individuals. Young individuals then compensate this reduction by increasing the
investment in the productive asset.
The previous arguments show that the willingness to postpone consumption is large
when  and 
 are large, which suggests that in this case the equilibrium will be
dynamically ine¢ cient. This is analyzed in the following subsection.
3.2 Dynamic e¢ ciency
The steady state equilibrium is dynamically e¢ cient when aggregate consumption
increases with investment. This is a direct implication of the results obtained by Abel
et al. (1989) and de la Croix and Michel (2002). As it is well known, this occurs
when the return on investment is larger than population growth. In this model, this
condition implies that (1 + 2=n) q > n: Using (6) and the steady state value of capital,
we obtain that the steady state is dynamically e¢ cient when the following condition
holds:
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
(1 )(1 )+

(1 )2(1 )+
(+2) + 1


1 

> : (18)
Using this condition, we get the following result:
Proposition 1 The equilibrium is dynamically e¢ cient if either (i)  < 1 or (ii)
 2 (1;2) and 
 < 
; where 1 = 1  1++
2
+2
; 2 =

1 
1+2
2
and

 =

2   
  1

1 + 2
 + 2

1  
2

:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The result in Proposition 1 implies that the equilibrium is dynamically ine¢ cient
when either  or 
 are su¢ ciently large. This result is obtained because there is
a positive relationship between the savings rate and the values of both  and 
: In
order to illustrate this mechanism that relates dynamic e¢ ciency with the distribution
of income by age group and that it is based on savings, we next show the relation
between the savings rate and condition (18). We rst use (5) and (6) to obtain
w=q = (1  ) k=: We use this equation, the expression of k and (14) to obtain:
1w
a
=
(1  ) (1  ) + 

(1  ) (1  )2 + 
   + 2 + 1; (19)
where a=1w is the savings rate dened as the ratio between savings and the labor
income of the young. Using (19), condition (18) can then be written as
1



1 

>
a
1w
:
Therefore, the steady state equilibrium is dynamically e¢ cient when the savings
rate is smaller than = (1  ) : This is exactly the same condition that the literature
has obtained for dynamic e¢ ciency. In fact, if  = 1, condition (18) simplies to
= (1  ) >   + 2 =  1 +  + 2 ; which is the condition obtained in Raurich and
Seegmuller (2015). However, in this case, the savings rate and the condition for dynamic
e¢ ciency are independent from the distribution of income by age group. In contrast,
as follows from (19), the savings rate increases with both  and 
 when  < 1. Note
that this is a crucial di¤erence that explains that dynamic e¢ ciency depends on the
income distribution by age group and it will also explain some of the main results in
the following section.
4 Equilibria with a bubble
We introduce in this section the portfolio decision of the consumer between a short term
speculative asset, b1;t and b2;t+1; and a long term productive asset, at+1. Hence, the
consumer decides at+1; b1;t and b2;t+1 to maximize the utility (1) subject to the budget
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constraints (2)-(4). The solution to this maximization problem is characterized by the
rst order conditions with respect to b1;t; b2;t+1; and at+1; which are, respectively,
1
c1;t
= 
Rt+1
c2;t+1
; (20)
1
c2;t+1
= 
Rt+2
c3;t+2
; (21)
1
c1;t
= 1
qt+1
c2;t+1
+ 22
qt+2
c3;t+2
: (22)
From combining (20)-(22) and using (6), we obtain the following non-arbitrage
condition between the returns from investing one unit in the speculative asset and
the returns from investing the same unit in productive capital:
Rt+1 = 1Ak
 1
t+1 +
2Ak
 1
t+2
Rt+2
: (23)
In Appendix B, we combine (2)-(6), (20), (21) and (23) to obtain the following two
equations:
b1;t =
 
 + 2

1 (1  )Akt   2(1 )Ak

t+1
Rt+1
1 +  + 2
  at+1; (24)
b2;t+1 =
22(1 )Akt+1+21(1 )Akt Rt+1
1++2
+ at+1
 
1Ak
 1
t+1  Rt+1

: (25)
Denition 2 Given k 1 > 0 and k0 > 0, an equilibrium is a path of
fat; kt; b1;t; b2;t; Rtg1t=1 that solves the system of di¤erence equations (23), (24) and
(25) and the market clearing conditions (9) and (10).
We proceed to obtain the steady state and then we characterize the distributions
of income for which an equilibrium with bubbles exists and also the distributions for
which these bubbles are productive, i.e. are associated with a larger level of capital per
unit of labor.
4.1 Steady state
We rst use (10) to obtain R = n: Next, from (23), we obtain that the steady state
value of capital in the equilibrium with bubbles, k; is:
k =

1A

n
 1
1 
:
We use (16) to deduce the steady state value of productive investment, a. From (24),
we obtain the steady state value of the bubbles owned by the young individuals:
b1 =
(n1 + 2) (1  )Ak
n
(  b1) ; (26)
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where b1 =
1
1++2
+ 1  : From (25), we obtain the steady state value of the bubbles
owned by the middle age individuals:
b2 = (n1 + 2)Ak
 (
  
b2) ; (27)
where 
b2 = 1  
 
1 

  2
1++2

: Finally, as explained in Section 2, the price of the
bubble is Nt 1 (nb1 + b2) ; where
nb1 + b2 = (n1 + 2) (1  )Ak

  b1 +

1   (
  
b2)

:
Recall that b1 is used to smooth consumption between young and middle age
individuals, whereas b2 is used to smooth consumption between middle age and old
individuals. This explains that the sign of b1 depends on ; whereas the sign of b2
depends on 
: If  > b1 then a large fraction of labor income is obtained by the
young individuals. The bubble is then used to transfer wealth to the second period of
life, i.e. b1 > 0: In contrast, if  < b1 then a large part of labor income is obtained by
middle age individuals. The bubble is then used to transfer wealth to the rst period
of life, b1 < 0: Similarly, if 
 > 
b2 then a large fraction of capital income is obtained
by the middle age individuals. These individuals use the bubble to transfer wealth to
the last period of life, i.e. b2 > 0: Obviously, the opposite occurs when 
 < 
b2 .
We next obtain conditions for which an equilibrium with bubbles exists.
Proposition 2 A steady state with a bubble exists if 
 > e
 where
e
 = 1  


(3   ) ;
and 3 =
1 2
1++2
+ 21  :
Proof. A bubble exists when its price is positive, which occurs when nb1 + b2 > 0:
Using (26) and (27), the previous inequality implies that 
 > e
:
From Proposition 2, it follows that a bubble does not exist when either  or 

are su¢ ciently small. A bubble may only exist if either the young individuals buy
the speculative asset (b1 > 0) ; or the middle age individuals buy this asset (b2 > 0) :
As already explained, the young individuals buy the speculative asset if they obtain
a su¢ ciently large income, which requires large : Similarly, middle age individuals
buy this asset when they obtain a su¢ ciently large amount of income, which requires
a su¢ ciently large value of 
:
4.2 Productive bubbles
Bubbles are a nancial instrument that facilitates consumption smoothing and, hence,
individuals do not need to use productive capital to smooth consumption. As a
consequence, the introduction of bubbles modies the stock of productive capital,
which may either increase or decrease. More specically, bubbles are productive when
k > k: From the comparisons between these two stocks of capital, it is easy to show
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that the bubble is unproductive if and only if the equilibrium without bubbles is
dynamically ine¢ cient. In this case, as in Tirole (1985), the bubble is used to postpone
consumption and, as a consequence, productive investment declines. The bubbly steady
state corresponds to the golden rule.
We have shown that a bubble may exist when the young generation obtains a
large fraction of the labor income and when the middle age generation obtains a
large fraction of the capital income. We have also shown that if these two fractions
are not too large then the steady state without bubbles is dynamically e¢ cient and,
hence, the bubble is productive. The following proposition summarizes these ndings
and provides a complete characterization of the conditions implying the existence of
productive bubbles.
Proposition 3 The steady state equilibrium satises the following properties:
1. If  < 1; then (i) the bubble exists and is productive when 
 > e
 and (ii) the
bubble does not exist when 
 < e
:
2. If  > 1; then (i) the bubble exists and is not productive when 
 > max
ne
;
o ;
(ii) the bubble exists and is productive when 
 2
e
;
 and (iii) the bubble does
not exist when 
 < e
:
Proof. From Proposition 2, it is immediate to show that the bubble exists if

 > e
. From Propositions 1, it is easy to show that the equilibrium without bubbles
is dynamically e¢ cient and the bubble is productive if either  < 1 or  > 1 and

 < 
, where the expressions of 
 and 1 are dened in Proposition 1.
Proposition 3 provides the main result of the paper. It shows that the distribution
of income by age group crucially determines the existence of productive bubbles. It
extends the analysis provided in Raurich and Seegmuller (2015), where it is already
shown that bubbles can increase the stock of productive capital when productive
investment is a long term investment. However, that paper restricts its attention to
the case where  = 1 and, hence, productive bubbles only arise if 1 > 1: Therefore,
the existence of productive bubbles does not depend on the distribution of income
by age group. Here, this distribution plays a crucial role, not only on the existence
of productive bubbles but also their features, i.e. whether they are characterized by
bi < 0 or bi > 0. This is studied in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 We distinguish among the following parametric regions:
1. If 1  2

(1 2)(+22)
(1++2)(2+)
; 
2
1++2
S =2+2
1++2
; +2
2
1++2

then productive bubbles
satisfy b1 < 0 and b2 > 0: It requires  < b1.
2. If 1  2

max

(1 2)(+22)
(1++2)(2+)
; 
2
1++2

; =2+
2
1++2

then productive bubbles
satisfy b1 < 0 and b2 > 0 when  < b1 and b1 > 0 and b2 < 0 otherwise.
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3. If 1  2

2
1++2
;
(1 2)(+22)
(1++2)(2+)

then productive bubbles satisfy b1 > 0 and
b2 < 0: It requires  > b1.
4. If 1  < min

2
1++2
;
(1 2)(+22)
(1++2)(2+)

or 1  >
+22
1++2
then the equilibrium
does not exhibit productive bubbles.
Proof. See Appendix C.
This proposition implies that, depending on the values of  and ; we can distinguish
among four possible regions. In the rst region, bubbles are productive only when b1 < 0
and b2 > 0: Panel a of Figure 1 shows this case by displaying the relationship between

 and  implied by the functions e
 and 
 when b1 < 0 and b2 > 0 is the only possible
productive bubble.4 Observe from Panel a that productive bubbles emerge when  is
small and 
 is large. This implies that productive bubbles arise when b1 < 0 and b2 > 0
if the middle age individuals obtain a su¢ ciently large fraction of total income. In this
case, individuals use the bubble to transfer wealth from the middle age to the other
two periods of life. On the one hand, middle age individuals postpone consumption,
which implies that b2 > 0: On the other hand, middle age individuals transfer wealth
to the young individuals, which implies that b1 < 0.
In the second region, bubbles can be productive when either b1 < 0 and b2 > 0 or
when b1 > 0 and b2 < 0: This case is displayed in Panel b of Figure 1. This gure
shows that, as in the previous case, bubbles are productive when b1 < 0 and b2 > 0
if the middle age obtains a su¢ ciently large fraction of income ( small and 
 large).
The gure also shows that bubbles are productive when b1 > 0 and b2 < 0 if the
middle age individuals obtain a small fraction of income ( large and 
 small). In
this case, consumption smoothing implies that wealth is transferred from the young
and old individuals to the middle age individuals. In the third region of the previous
proposition, bubbles can be productive only when b1 > 0 and b2 < 0: This case is
displayed in Panel c of Figure 1. As in the second region, this productive bubble arises
when the middle age individuals obtain a small fraction of total income. Finally, the
last region is displayed in Panel d of Figure 1. In this region, productive bubbles do
not exist for any income distribution.
From inspection of Figure 1, we obtain clear insights about the e¤ects of non-
marginal increases in  and 
 that change the characteristics of the equilibrium. On
the one hand, an increase in  facilitates the existence of an equilibrium with bubbles.
These bubbles can be productive or unproductive, depending on the value of 
: A large
value of  implies that the fraction of income obtained by young individuals is large
and, hence, young individuals are willing to hold the bubble to postpone consumption.
On the other hand, an increase in 
 also facilitates the existence of an equilibrium with
bubbles. A larger value of 
 increases the income obtained by middle age individuals.
These individuals are then willing to hold the bubble to postpone consumption.
Proposition 4 shows that bubbles can be productive in two very di¤erent situations:
(i) when b1 < 0 and b2 > 0; and (ii) when b1 > 0 and b2 < 0: In the rst situation, the
4The productive bubbles obtained in Raurich and Seegmuller (2015) are a particular example of the
bubbles obtained in Case 1.
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bubble is productive as it is used to transfer wealth to the young, who then increase
productive investment. In the second situation, the bubble reduces the consumption of
the old individuals and, as a consequence, young individuals increase savings in order
to keep their consumption when old. If the increase in the savings of the young is large
enough, productive investment increases even though part of the savings are used to
transfer wealth to the middle age individuals (b1 > 0) : In order to show more explicitly
this argument, we compare the savings rate in the economy with bubbles with the
savings rate in the economy without bubbles. The savings rate is dened as the ratio
between assets accumulated when young and the income of the young individuals. We
rst use (5) and (24) to obtain the savings rate in the economy with bubbles,
a+ b1
1w
=
 + 2   1 
1 +  + 2
Note that in the economy with bubbles young individuals accumulate both productive
assets and speculative assets. Using (19), we obtain the savings rate in the economy
without bubbles, where the young individuals only accumulate productive assets, i.e.:
a
1w
=
(1  ) (1  )2 + 
   + 2
(1  ) (1  )  1 + 2+ 
  1 +  + 2 :
Note that both expressions of the savings rate are di¤erent when  < 1; whereas they
coincide when  = 1: As a consequence, when  = 1; productive capital is larger with
bubbles if and only if b1 < 0. On the contrary, when  < 1; capital can be larger with
bubbles even if b1 > 0, as the savings rates can be larger in the economy with bubbles.
From the comparison between the two savings rates, it follows that the savings rate of
the economy with bubbles is larger when the following condition on the distribution of
income by age group holds:

 <

  1 + 
2
1 +  + 2

1  

This condition implies that the savings rate is larger in the economy with bubbles
when either  is su¢ ciently large or when 
 is su¢ ciently small. Therefore, these two
conditions show that the savings rate is larger when the middle age individuals are
poor, which is precisely the condition that makes bubbles be productive when b1 > 0
and b2 < 0:
5 Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policies cause large changes in the distribution of income by age group. The
analysis in the previous sections suggests that these changes may a¤ect both the
existence of bubbles and also the e¤ect of bubbles on production. The purpose of
this section is to study a scal policy that consists of taxes on capital income, k; taxes
on labor income paid by the young individuals, 1w; and taxes on labor income paid by
the middle age individuals, 2w.
5 We assume that tax rates on labor income depend on
5Taxes on bubble returns could have been introduced. If they were introduced, the after tax return
from the bubbles would be eR = 1 + (R  1) (1   b) ; where  b is the tax rate on bubble returns: As
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the age group of the tax payers to introduce progressive taxes. Finally, we assume that
government revenues are used to nance a useless government spending, Gt. Thus, an
increase in the tax rates will cause a variation in this government spending that will
not a¤ect individuals decisions, as government spending is assumed to be useless. The
government budget constraint is:
1w1wtNt + 
2
w2wtNt 1 + k (qt1atNt 1 + qt2at 1Nt 2) = Gt:
The budget constraints of the individuals, equations (2)-(4), are modied as follows:
c1;t + at+1 + b1;t =
 
1  1w

1wt; (28)
c2;t+1 + b2;t+1 =
 
1  2w

2wt+1 + (1  k) qt+11at+1 +Rt+1b1;t; (29)
c3;t+2 = Rt+2b2;t+1 + (1  k) qt+22at+1: (30)
5.1 Steady state
We start by analyzing the equilibrium of the model when there are no bubbles. In this
case, the household maximizes the utility under the budget constraints (28)-(30) when
b1;t = b2;t = 0. We get:
1
(1  1w) 1wt   at+1
=
(1  k)1
(1  2w) 2wt+1qt+1 + (1  k)1at+1
+
2
at+1
:
In order to obtain the steady state without bubbles, we substitute in the previous
equation (5), (6), and (9), and we use the expressions of  and 
 to obtain the steady
state value of capital:
k =

n

A1(1 )(1 1w)
 1
 1

(1++2)(1 k)
+(1+2)(1 )(1 2w)(1 )
(+2)(1 k)
+2(1 )(1 2w)(1 )
 1
 1
: (31)
In this section, 
 and  still measure the distribution by age group of before taxes
labor and capital income.
We proceed to obtain the steady state of the equilibrium with bubbles. To this
end, we assume that the consumer can smooth consumption using bubbles. Hence, the
consumer maximizes the utility function subject to (28)-(30). The rst order conditions
of the household problem are:
c2;t+1 = Rt+1c1;t (32)
c3;t+2 = 
2Rt+2Rt+1c1;t (33)
1
c1;t
= 1
(1  k) qt+1
c2;t+1
+ 2
2 (1  k) qt+2
c3;t+2
: (34)
From combining (32)-(34) and using (6), we obtain the following non-arbitrage
condition between the returns from the speculative asset and the returns from
R = n then eR = 1 + (n  1) (1   b) = n  (n  1) b. However, these taxes will reduce the increase of
the price of the bubble if n > 1 and, hence, they would be a subsidy when the household is a short-seller
of the bubble. To avoid this problem, we do not introduce these taxes.
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productive capital:
Rt+1 = (1  k)1Ak 1t+1 +
(1  k)2Ak 1t+2
Rt+2
: (35)
We use (9), (28)-(30), (32), (33) and (35) to obtain the following steady state values
(see Appendix D):
k =

(1  k)1A

n
 1
1 
; (36)
b1 =
(n1 + 2)Ak

n

(1  ) (1+)(1 
1
w) (1 2w)(1 )
1++2
   (1  k)

; (37)
and
b2 = (n1 + 2)Ak


(1  ) 
2(1 2w)(1 )+2(1 1w)
1++2
   (1  k) (1  
)

; (38)
The steady state price of the bubble is positive if nb1 + b2 > 0; where
nb1 + b2 = Ak
 (n1 + 2)z;
and
z = (1  ) (1+2)(1 
1
w) (1 2)(1 2w)(1 )
1++2
   (1  k) (2  
) :
A steady state with a bubble exists if the price of the bubble is positive, which
requires that z > 0: Therefore, the e¤ects of scal policy on the existence of bubbles
are obtained from a simple comparative static analysis on the function z. The results
obtained from this analysis are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 The following scal policies facilitate the existence of an equilibrium
with bubbles: (i) a reduction in the labor income taxes paid by the young individuals;
(ii) an increase in the labor income taxes paid by the middle age individuals; (iii) an
increase in the capital income taxes.
Proof. The results follow directly from using the function z:
Labor income taxes paid by young individuals reduce their income after taxes.
This limits the possibility to postpone consumption using bubbles. Labor income taxes
paid by middle age individuals reduce their income after taxes. As a consequence,
individuals use bubbles to postpone consumption towards the middle age individuals.
Thus, an increase in this tax facilitates the existence of an equilibrium with bubbles.
Finally, capital income taxes reduce the after tax income of both middle age and old
individuals. Since capital has a lower return, traders have more incentive to invest in
the speculative asset. Therefore, an increase in these taxes facilitates the existence of
bubbles that will be used to postpone consumption.
We distinguish between the labor income taxes paid by young and middle age
individuals to introduce progressive taxes in the analysis. The average labor income
of middle age individuals is generally larger than the average labor income of young
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individuals and, thus, it is reasonable to assume that 2w > 
1
w: However, we could have
assumed the same tax rate. In this case, the e¤ect of an increase in the labor income
tax on the existence of bubbles depends on the value of : If  is large, the labor
income tax is mainly a tax on the income of the young and, hence, an increase in this
tax hinders the possibility of bubbles. The opposite occurs when  is small.
5.2 Analysis of the e¤ects of scal policy
We proceed to study the e¤ect of scal policies on production both in the economy
without bubbles and in the economy with bubbles. This will allow us to characterize
those scal policies that promote productive bubbles. At this point, it is important to
clarify that the e¤ect of scal policy on production follows directly from the e¤ect that
scal policy has on the stock of productive capital.
Using equation (31), it can be shown that the steady state stock of productive
capital of the economy without bubbles, k, decreases when (i) the tax rate on the labor
income of the young individuals increases; (ii) the tax rate on the labor income of the
middle age individuals decreases; and (iii) the tax rates on capital income increases.
The e¤ects of labor income taxes are explained because, in the absence of bubbles,
productive capital is used to smooth consumption. Therefore, an increase in the labor
income tax paid by the young individuals reduces their income net of taxes, which
causes a reduction in productive investment. An increase in the labor income tax
paid by the middle age individuals reduces their after tax income. Young individuals
then increase investment in productive capital to postpone consumption. Finally, taxes
on capital income reduce the return from productive capital, which implies a raise of
the discounted income. Therefore, young households consume more, which causes the
reduction in productive investment.
Using (36), we can easily see that the steady state stock of productive capital of the
economy with bubbles, k, decreases following an increase of the tax on capital income.
This result follows from the fact that this tax reduces the return from productive
investment and there is a no-arbitrage condition between holding capital and the
bubble. As a direct implication, this stock of productive capital does not depend
on the di¤erent taxes on labor income.
The previous results imply that the e¤ect on the stock of capital of taxes on labor
income depend on the existence of bubbles. As a consequence, scal policy may make
bubbles productive or unproductive. To study the e¤ect of scal policy, we compare
the stocks of capital k and k and we show that k < k when 	 > 0; where
	 = 1 +
(1  )  1  2w (1  ) +  (1  k) 

(1 + ) (1  k) 
 + 2 (1  ) (1  2w) (1  )
  (1  )
 
1  1w


 (1  k) :
Straightforward comparative statics on the function 	 show that bubbles may become
productive as a consequence of the following scal policies: (i) an increase in the labor
income taxes paid by the young individuals and (ii) a reduction in the labor income
taxes paid by the middle age individuals. As explained before, an increase in the labor
income taxes paid by the young makes individuals use bubbles to transfer wealth to the
rst period of life. As a consequence, bubbles either disappear or become productive.
Obviously, the e¤ect is the opposite when the scal policy consists of increasing the
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taxes paid by the middle age individuals, either existence of bubbles is facilitated or
bubbles become unproductive. Finally, an increase in the taxes on capital income has
an ambiguous e¤ect on the existence of productive bubbles. This is explained by the
fact that these taxes reduce the stock of capital both when the equilibrium exhibits
bubbles and when it does not exhibit bubbles.
These results on the e¤ect of scal policy on the stock of capital are summarized
in Figure 2, that shows how both stocks of productive capital depend on the taxes on
labor income. Panel a shows that if the tax rate on the labor income of the young is
su¢ ciently small, then the bubble will be used to postpone consumption and, hence,
it will be unproductive. To see this, note that k < k for low values of this tax rate.
As the tax rate increases, the bubble becomes productive and, eventually, the bubble
disappears. Panel b shows the e¤ects of the tax rate on the income of the middle age
individuals. These e¤ects are the opposite from the ones displayed in Panel a. When
this tax rate is su¢ ciently small, the bubble may not exist. When the tax rate increases,
a productive bubble exists. Finally, for su¢ ciently large values of the tax rate, k > k
and, hence, the bubble becomes unproductive.
Figure 2 introduces an important implication for scal policy. It shows that
marginal increases in the labor income taxes that do not a¤ect the existence of bubbles
have no e¤ect on the stock of productive capital in the economy with bubbles. However,
a non-marginal increase in the tax rate on the labor income of the young that makes the
bubble disappear will cause a dramatic reduction in the stock of capital since the only
long run equilibrium is the steady state without bubble. A large decline in the stock
of productive capital would also occur if we instead consider a non-marginal reduction
in the tax rate on the labor income of the middle age individuals that also eliminates
bubbles. These results point out an important discontinuity in the e¤ects that scal
policy has on production.
The e¤ects illustrated in the rst two panels of Figure 2 are obtained when scal
policy makes a productive bubble disappear. However, for a di¤erent distribution
of income by age group, the same scal policy may cause the disappearance of an
unproductive bubble. This possibility is illustrated in Panels c and d of Figure 2, that
display, respectively, the e¤ects of taxes on the labor income of the young individuals
and the e¤ects of taxes on the labor income of the middle age individuals. These two
panels show that in this case a non-marginal change in the tax rates that eliminates
the bubble will cause an increase, instead of a decrease in the stock of capital once the
economy reaches the bubbleless steady state.
We conclude that the e¤ects of scal policies crucially depend on the distribution
of income by age group. It follows that in order to obtain clear insights on the
e¤ects of scal policy we need to perform a numerical analysis based on a plausible
parametrization. This is the purpose of the following section.
5.3 Numerical Analysis
We x the value of the parameters as follows. First, without loss of generality A and
1 are normalized to one. Second,  = 0:3; which implies a labor income share equal
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to 70%:6 Third,  = 0:93; which implies a savings rate of 7%.7 Apart from these
parameters that are assumed to be common across countries, we consider two sets of
country specic parameters. First, the values of  and 
 are displayed in Table 2
and they are computed as it is explained in Appendix E. Second, tax rates and the
population growth rate are obtained from the OECD data set and they are displayed
in Table 3.8
The results from this calibration are displayed in Table 4.9 This table shows the
value of the capital stock in both economies (bubble and no bubble) and the value
of z. The sign of z determines the existence of the bubble, with a negative sign
implying that the economy does not exhibit a bubble. As it is clear from this table,
only the US economy may exhibit a bubble. This bubble is productive, as follows from
the comparison between the two capital stocks. In contrast, none of the European
economies may exhibit a bubble according to this analysis. From the comparison
between the fundamentals of the European economies and those of the US economy,
displayed in Tables 2 and 3, it follows that the main di¤erence is scal policy. In fact,
there are no relevant di¤erences between US and European economies in the population
growth rate, nor in the distribution of income by age group. The only clear di¤erence
with respect to European economies are the larger taxes on capital income and the
smaller taxes on labor income. This di¤erent scal policy implies that the tax burden
in European economies is more concentrated on the young individuals, which limits
investment in productive capital and prevents the existence of an equilibrium with
bubbles.
The results in Table 4 suggest that if European economies change their scal policy
then productive capital should increase. This is studied in Table 5, where we set the
value of the tax rates in the European economies at the level of the US. In this table,
we distinguish between three groups of European economies. The rst group, formed
by 6 countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany and Italy), does not
exhibit bubbles with this new scal policy. These economies are characterized by very
low values of 
; which, as follows from the analysis of the previous section, hinders
the existence of bubbles. The second group, formed by 4 economies (Czech Republic,
Greece, Norway and Poland) may exhibit unproductive bubbles. These are economies
characterized by large values of both  and 
 and, hence, individuals in these economies
use the bubble to postpone consumption. Finally, the last group of countries, formed
by 7 countries (Austria, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United
Kingdom) may exhibit productive bubbles. These seven economies are characterized
6There is not a consensus in the literature on the value of the labor income share. In a recent paper,
Koh, Santaeulalia-Llopis and Zheng (2016) show that in the US the labor income share is stable and
close to 70% if intellectual property capital is not considered as a form of capital income. We choose
this stable value of the labor income share for our steady state analysis.
7Using the OECD savings rate, we obtain that the average savings rate in the period 1970-2015 in
the countries displayed in Table 1 is equal to 7%. The average savings rate for these countries obtained
from our simulation is also 7% when  = 0:93:
8The population growth rate n is obtained from the OECD data set as the ratio between the size of
the young population and the size of the middle age population. In Table 3, we provide a unique tax
rate on the labor income.
9The results in Table 4 cannot be used for cross country comparisons in the level of the GDP per
capita, as countries may di¤er in both the e¢ ciency units of labor and in the technology.
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by intermediate values of both  and 
: This distribution of income together with
the scal policy facilitates that individuals use the bubble to smooth consumption by
placing resources from the middle age towards the young and the old. The increase in
the disposable income of the young makes the bubble productive.
An interesting remark is obtained from the comparison of the stocks of capital
in Tables 4 and 5. From this comparison, it follows that the proposed change in
scal policy will cause a substantial increase in the stock of capital of the Europeans
economies.10 The results in Table 5 show that the average increase in the stock of capital
of these European economies would be 25% if the economy remains in an equilibrium
without bubbles. At this point, it is important to introduce some words of caution on
the large e¤ects of scal policy obtained in the previous analysis. First, the changes
in the stock of capital are obtained by comparing two di¤erent steady states. Thus,
these e¤ects of scal policy may only occur in the long run. Second, the e¤ects of
scal policy crucially depend on the value of  and 
: To obtain these values, we have
introduced assumptions on the distribution of labor and capital income by age group
that, as explained in Appendix E, may introduce biases on the actual values of both 

and : Therefore, the results in Table 5 should only be considered as illustrative of the
large e¤ects that scal policies may have when they modify the distribution of income
by age group.
6 Concluding remarks
We are interested in the interplay between distribution of income by age group and
productive bubbles. We have studied a three period OG model where productive
investment done in the rst period of life is a long term investment whose return
occurs in the following two periods. The bubble is a short term speculative investment
that facilitates intertemporal consumption smoothing. Our main result shows that the
distribution of labor and capital income by age group determines both the existence of
bubbles and their e¤ect on production. We rst show that if a large part of the labor
income is obtained by middle age individuals and a large part of the capital income
is obtained by old individuals then the equilibrium does not exhibit bubbles. We also
show that if the fraction of labor income obtained by the young individuals is large and
the fraction of capital income obtained by the middle age individuals is also large then
an equilibrium with unproductive bubbles exists. These bubbles are used to postpone
consumption. Finally, we show that the equilibrium exhibits productive bubbles in
two di¤erent situations: when the middle age individuals obtain a large fraction of
total income and when these individuals obtain a small fraction of total income. In
the rst case, bubbles are productive because they are used to transfer wealth to the
young individuals, who then increase investment in the productive asset. In the second
case, bubbles are productive because the savings rate is larger in the equilibrium with
bubbles.
Fiscal policies cause large changes in the distribution of income by age group and,
as a consequence, they modify the e¤ect that bubbles have on production and they can
10United Kingdom is an exception. Taxes are substantially lower in this country and, hence, the
change in scal policy will increase taxes and reduce productive capital.
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either facilitate or hinder the existence of bubbles. In particular, we show that large
capital income taxes facilitate the existence of an equilibrium with bubbles. We also
show that the e¤ect of an increase in the labor income taxes depends on the age group
of the tax payers. We conclude that the same scal policy may have very di¤erent
e¤ects on production depending on the distribution of income by age group. This
conclusion is illustrated numerically by showing the e¤ect that a scal policy has on
several European economies.
Our analysis can be used to study the e¤ects of shocks that modify the distribution
of income by age group. An interesting example is population aging that will increase
the size of the oldest age group. As a consequence, it will reduce the value of 
 in
the following years, which will reduce the stock of productive capital. Our results
suggest that population aging can be particularly harmful in those economies where
productive bubbles nance a large stock of productive capital, as these bubbles, due to
the reduction in 
; may not be sustainable.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
We rewrite condition (18) as
(1  ) (1  )2 (2   ) > 

 
 + 2

(  1) ;
where 2 and 1 are dened in the main text.
As
 
1 + 2

=2 >
 
1 +  + 2

=
 
 + 2

; there are only three possibilities: (i)
 > 2 and condition (18) is not satised; (ii) 1 <  < 2 and condition (18) is
satised when 
 < 
; where 
 is obtained from the above equation; and (iii)  < 1
and condition (18) is always satised.
B Equilibrium with bubbles
We rst use (2), (3) and (4), to rewrite equations (20) and (21) as
b1;t =
 
 + 2

(1wt   at+1)  2wt+1Rt+1  
h
qt+11 +
qt+2
Rt+2
2
i
at+1
Rt+1
1 +  + 2
; (39)
b2;t+1 =
22wt+1+
2qt+11at+1+
2(1wt at+1)Rt+1 (1+)
qt+2
Rt+2
2at+1
1++2
: (40)
From using (5) and (6), equations (39) and (40) can be rewritten as
b1;t =
(+2)(1(1 )Akt  at+1) 
2(1 )Akt+1
Rt+1
 
"
Ak 1t+1 1+
Ak 1t+2
Rt+2
2
#
at+1
Rt+1
1++2
; (41)
b2;t+1 =
22(1 )Akt+1+2Ak 1t+1 1at+1+2[1(1 )Akt  at+1]Rt+1 
(1+)Ak 1t+2 2at+1
Rt+2
1++2
:(42)
We use (23) to rewrite (41) and (42) as (24) and (25) in the main text.
C Proof of Proposition 4
We recall that a bubble exists i¤:

 > e
() = 1  


(3   )
Note that e
() is a strictly decreasing line (e
0 () < 0), e
 (3) = 0 and e
 (0) = 1,
with 0 = 1 
2
1++2
+ 1  .
We also recall that a bubble is productive i¤  < 1 or  2 (1;2) and:

 < 
() =

2   
  1

1 + 2
 + 2

1  
2

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It can be shown that 1 < 2, 
 (1) = +1, 
 (2) = 0 and 
 (1) = 0. Moreover,


0
() =
1
2(  1)2
1 + 2
 + 2
[(1   2) (1  )  (2   ) (  1)] < 0
for all  2 (1;minf2; 1g). In addition,


00
() =
1 + 2
( + 2)2

2(2   1)(1  )
(  1)3 +
2(2   1)
(  1)2

> 0
for all  2 (1; 1). Hence, 
() is a convex function, decreasing for all  such that

() > 0.
We further note that e
 (b1) = 
b2 and 
 (b1) = 
b2 . This means that e
() and

 () crosses once at the point (;
) = (b1 ;
b2). Since e
() is a line and 
 () is
convex, they cross at most twice.
We know that, on the one hand, b1 > 0 if  > b1 and b2 > 0 if 
 > 
b2 and, on
the other hand, a bubble is productive if 
 < 
(). Since 
 = 
() goes through
(b1 ;
b2) and is a convex function, decreasing for all  such that 
() > 0, a bubble
cannot be productive if b1 > 0 and b2 > 0, whatever the values of b1 and 
b2 . Hence,
a bubble is productive if either b1 < 0 and b2 > 0 or b1 > 0 and b2 < 0.
The existence of productive bubbles with b1 < 0 and b2 > 0 requires either 1 > 0,
which is equivalent to:

1   >
 
1  2   + 2
1 +  + 2
or 1 < 0 and 
 (0) > 1, i.e. 
1  2   + 2
1 +  + 2
>

1   >
 
1  2   + 22 
1 +  + 2

(2 + )
Moreover, 0 < 1 if and only if:

1   <
 + 22
1 +  + 2
When these inequalities are satised, there is a non-empty set of  such that there
exists a productive bubble for 
 = 1. By continuity, this result holds for 
 < 1 but
su¢ ciently close to 1. We deduce the existence of productive bubbles with b1 < 0 and
b2 > 0 for 1  2

(1 2)(+22)
(1++2)(2+)
; +2
2
1++2

. This occurs if  < b1 .
To show the existence of productive bubbles with b1 > 0 and b2 < 0, we rst prove
that 3 < 1 is equivalent to:

1   <
=2 + 2
1 +  + 2
and 3 < 2 i¤:

1   >
2
1 +  + 2
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If these two inequalities are satised, there is a non-empty interval for  such that
there exists a productive bubble for 
 = 0. By continuity, this result holds for 
 > 0
but su¢ ciently close to 0. We deduce the existence of productive bubbles with b1 > 0
and b2 < 0 for 1  2

2
1++2
; =2+
2
1++2

. This occurs if  > b1 .
We deduce the di¤erent cases of Proposition 4 comparing the two intervals
(1 2)(+22)
(1++2)(2+)
; +2
2
1++2

and

2
1++2
; =2+
2
1++2

and taking into account that
max

(1 2)(+22)
(1++2)(2+)
; 
2
1++2

< =2+
2
1++2
< +2
2
1++2
.
D Equilibrium with bubbles and taxes
We use (28), (29) and (30) to rewrite equations (32) and (33) as
b2;t+1 =
2(1 2w)2wt+1+2(1 k)at+1qt+11+2Rt+1[(1 1w)1wt at+1] (1+)(1 k)at+1
qt+22
Rt+2
1++2
;
(43)
b1;t =
(+2)[(1 1w)1wt at+1] 
(1 2w)2wt+1
Rt+1
  (1 k)at+1
Rt+1

qt+22
Rt+2
+qt+11

(1++2)
: (44)
From using (5), (6) and (35), equations (43) and (44) can be rewritten as
b1;t =
(1+)(1 1w)1(1 )Akt  
(1 2w)2(1 )Akt+1
Rt+1
1++2
  at+1;
b2;t+1 =
2(1 2w)2(1 )Akt+1+2Rt+1(1 1w)1(1 )Akt
1++2
+ at+1
 
1  1k

1Ak
 1
t+1  Rt+1

:
In a steady state, R = n and a = n [(n1 + 2) = (n1 + 2)] k. We deduce:
b1 = (1  )Ak

(1+)(1 1w)1 (1 2w) 2n
1++2
 

n1 + 2
n1 + 2

n
(1  )Ak 1

;
and
b2 = (1  )Ak
"
2[(1 2w)2+(1 1w)n1]
1++2
+

n1 + 2
n1 + 2

n

(1  k)1Ak 1   n

(1  )Ak 1
#
:
From (35), we also obtain:
Ak 1 =

n2
n1 + 2

1
(1  k):
We use the last three equations to obtain (37) and (38) in the main text.
E Empirical strategy to obtain  and 

In this appendix we describe how the data in Table 2 on the distribution of gross labor
and capital income by age has been obtained. The data sources used are the US census
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and the Eurostat. US government census provides average income and total population
in 2015 for the following age groups: young (age 25-44), middle age (age 45-64) and
old (65 and over). Eurostat provides the same data in 2015 for the di¤erent European
economies shown in Table 1 and for the following age groups: young (age 25-49), middle
age (age 50-64) and old (65 and over). As the number of years people belong to each
age group is di¤erent with the Eurostat data, we divide total income of each age group
by the number of years individuals belong to each age group.11 This normalization
makes the di¤erent age groups comparable. From using these data, we obtain the total
income of each age group and the total income of the economy is obtained as the sum
of the income of each age group. The fraction of total income obtained by each age
group is displayed in Table 1.
We use the labor income share and total income to obtain for each country the
labor income and the capital income.12 Consistent with the assumptions in the model,
we assume that (i) the young individuals do not obtain capital income and (ii) the old
individuals do not obtain labor income. Based on these assumptions, we obtain  as
the ratio between the income of the young and the total labor income in the economy
and we obtain b
 as the di¤erence between one and the ratio between the income of the
old and the total capital income of the economy. The values of  and b
 are displayed
in Table 2.
The value of  and b
 are obviously biased because of the two aforementioned
assumptions. To measure how problematic are these two assumptions, we use the US
census data to obtain that the fraction of labor income obtained by the old individuals
is only 4% and the net worth owned by the young is only 9.4%. These small numbers
imply that the two assumptions are not too strong and, hence, the bias in the measures
of  and b
 should be small.
A more serious problem with the data is that the income of the old also includes
the pensions they receive, which should not be considered as capital income. Using the
notation introduced in Section 5 and the denition of b
, we obtain
b
t = 1  qt+22at+1 + pt+2
qt+11at+1n+ qt+22at+1 + pt+2
;
where pt+2 are the pensions received by individuals when old. Note that b
t is the
di¤erence between one and the ratio between the income of the old and the total
capital income. As follows from the data, pensions are included in the income of the
old and also in the total income. b
t at the steady state simplies as
b
 = n1
n1 + 2 +
p
qa
;
where p is the steady state value of the pension. Let  the replacement rate of pensions
and, hence, p = 2w: Using the replacement rate, (5), (6), and (9), we obtain

 = b
 1 + (1  )  (1  )
n

;
11We consider that 20 is the number of years individuals are old. This is approximately the value of
the life expectancy at 65 in the economies considered.
12The labor income share in 2014 is obtained from the Penn World Table.
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where 
 = n1= (n1 + 2) is the fraction of capital income obtained by the middle age
individuals and that we have used in the main text of this paper. The previous equation
clearly shows that b
 is a biased measure of the distribution of capital income by age
group when pensions are introduced. In the last step of our empirical strategy, we use
this equation to obtain the value of 
: To this end, we must obtain the values of ; 
and n: The value of  is obtained from OECD data set 2014, where the replacement
rate is dened as the gross pension divided by the gross pre-retirement wage and, hence,
it corresponds to our denition of : The value of  is obtained from the labor income
share in the Penn World Table 2014 and the value of n is obtained from OECD data
as the ratio between total population age 45-64 divided by total population age 65 and
over. The value of 
 obtained from this analysis is displayed in the last column of
Table 2.
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F Figures and Tables
Table 1. Income distribution by age group13
Young Middle Age Old
Austria 0,36 0,40 0,24
Belgium 0,38 0,40 0,22
Czech Republic 0,43 0,37 0,20
Denmark 0,36 0,42 0,22
Finland 0,35 0,42 0,23
France 0,33 0,39 0,28
Germany 0,36 0,40 0,24
Greece 0,37 0,36 0,27
Hungary 0,39 0,37 0,24
Italy 0,34 0,38 0,28
Netherlands 0,37 0,41 0,22
Norway 0,38 0,40 0,22
Poland 0,41 0,39 0,20
Portugal 0,37 0,37 0,26
Spain 0,39 0,37 0,24
Sweden 0,36 0,40 0,24
United Kingdom 0,40 0,38 0,22
United States 0,36 0,45 0,19
Source. US census data and Eurostat.
13The second column is the fraction of income obtained by young individuals, the third column is
the fraction of income obtained by middle age individuals and the last column is the fraction of income
obtained by old individuals.
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Table 2. Income distribution by age group14
 b
 

Austria 0,62 0,44 0,55
Belgium 0,61 0,42 0,49
Czech Republic 0,84 0,60 0,63
Denmark 0,56 0,38 0,51
Finland 0,57 0,40 0,49
France 0,53 0,26 0,33
Germany 0,57 0,36 0,42
Greece 0,78 0,48 0,52
Hungary 0,65 0,41 0,48
Italy 0,63 0,39 0,47
Netherlands 0,61 0,44 0,56
Norway 0,72 0,54 0,59
Poland 0,74 0,55 0,58
Portugal 0,64 0,38 0,47
Spain 0,66 0,42 0,52
Sweden 0,63 0,45 0,55
United Kingdom 0,66 0,44 0,47
United States 0,60 0,52 0,58
Source. See Appendix E.
14 is the fraction of labor income obtained by the young individuals. b
 is the fraction of capital
income obtained by the middle age individuals when pensions are considered part of the capital income
of the old. Finally, 
 is the fraction of capital income obtained by middle age individuals when pensions
are not considered as capital income of the old.
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Table 3. Taxes and population growth15
w k n
Austria 0; 50 0; 25 0; 96
Belgium 0; 55 0; 34 0; 98
Czech Republic 0; 43 0; 19 1; 14
Denmark 0; 36 0; 23 0; 94
Finland 0; 44 0; 20 0; 89
France 0; 48 0; 38 0; 97
Germany 0; 49 0; 30 0; 84
Greece 0; 39 0; 26 1; 13
Hungary 0; 49 0; 19 1; 07
Italy 0; 48 0; 31 0; 99
Netherlands 0; 36 0; 25 0; 91
Norway 0; 37 0; 27 1; 08
Poland 0; 35 0; 19 1; 10
Portugal 0; 42 0; 29 1; 02
Spain 0; 40 0; 28 1; 16
Sweden 0; 43 0; 22 1; 01
United Kingdom 0; 31 0; 20 1; 05
United States 0; 32 0; 39 1; 00
Source. OECD Data base.
15The population growth rate is obtained from the ratio between the population in the interval
25-44 years and the population in the interval 45 to 64. The population growth rate is obtained for
all countries in the year 2013, except for Belgium, France, Greece, Netherlands and Poland that it is
obtained in the year 2012.
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Table 4. Results from the simulation
k k z
Austria 0; 12      0; 55
Belgium 0; 12      0; 63
Czech Republic 0; 16      0; 07
Denmark 0; 17      0; 50
Finland 0; 16      0; 65
France 0; 19      0; 74
Germany 0; 19      0; 70
Greece 0; 20      0; 09
Hungary 0; 14      0; 63
Italy 0; 16      0; 50
Netherlands 0; 18      0; 32
Norway 0; 16      0; 05
Poland 0; 18      0; 13
Portugal 0; 18      0; 39
Spain 0; 15      0; 27
Sweden 0; 14      0; 46
United Kingdom 0; 23      0; 30
United States 0; 15 0; 19 0; 01
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Table 5. Results from the simulation
k k z
Austria 0; 18 0; 22 0; 05
Belgium 0; 20      0; 05
Czech Republic 0; 20 0; 14 0; 69
Denmark 0; 18      0; 16
Finland 0; 21      0; 14
France 0; 28      0; 42
Germany 0; 29      0; 21
Greece 0; 23 0; 19 0; 42
Hungary 0; 20 0; 23 0; 06
Italy 0; 22      0; 01
Netherlands 0; 19 0; 23 0; 04
Norway 0; 18 0; 17 0; 34
Poland 0; 19 0; 17 0; 38
Portugal 0; 22 0; 25 0; 02
Spain 0; 17 0; 18 0; 13
Sweden 0; 18 0; 21 0; 07
United Kingdom 0; 22 0; 24 0; 06
United States 0; 15 0; 19 0; 01
We assume that k = 0; 39 and w = 0; 32
34
Figure 1. Bubbles and the distribution of income
Panel a Panel b
Panel c Panel d
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Figure 2. The e¤ect of scal policies on capital
Panel a Panel b
Panel c Panel d
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